INTRODUCTION
This Article evaluates the potential use of "responsibility initiatives" in gender-based violence, with a specific focus on adult intimate partner violence. This Article analyzes the law's role in furthering victims' recovery from the trauma caused by gender-based violence through promoting acceptance of responsibility by offenders.
1 Perpetrators of abuse often minimize or 1 This Article falls within the author's larger project examining justice responses to sexual and physical violence against women, particularly the use of restorative justice in these cases. The author is the legal advisor for a pilot research demonstration project in Pima County, Arizona, funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, implementing such a response in acquaintance rape cases. and Bierschbach's federally-based recommendations simply are not applicable to most gender-based violence. 4 Second, and more importantly, the fact that offender denial is inherent in the fundamental dynamics underlying both intimate partner violence and in acquaintance sexual assault suggests that Bibas's and Bierschbach's proposals will gain little headway in the context of these particular crimes. Finally, secondary consequences to sexual assault offenders hint at another way that the Bibas and Bierschbach proposals will prove ineffective in these cases: accepting responsibility and admission of a sexual offense will subject many if not all of these offenders to lifetime sex offender registration requirements. 5 That alone is sufficient to keep most acquaintance rapists from ever acknowledging their sex offending in a court taking place in federal courts, however, is a different matter, and whether the Supreme Court would uphold prosecutions under that statute as within Congress's power to enact is also an open question following the Supreme Court's decision in two important cases. In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which criminalized possession of a weapon on school property, as beyond the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) . In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court held that the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act was outside the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power because the underlying conduct, interpersonal violence against women, did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce. 529 U. S. 598, 616-19 (2000) . Although the latter did not involve the criminal sanctions in VAWA, when Morrison is read in conjunction with Lopez, one might wonder if the Supreme Court would follow the same reasoning and find the provisions of VAWA criminalizing firearms unconstitutional. Following the Lopez decision, however, the Gun-Free School Zones Act was amended by the Lautenberg Act, which included relevant provisions for violence against women. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8) (criminalizing possession of a firearm for defendant under an order of protection), and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (criminalizing possession of a firearm for defendant convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor). Even if those revised provisions are ultimately found to be constitutionally sound, it remains the case that almost all genderbased crimes occur in state courts under state criminal laws. For an illustration of the contrast between the number of non-interpersonal violence criminal cases, violent crime cases, and sexual violence against adults cases filed in federal courts, Mar. 5, 2012) . 4 The reasons for this are constitutional: federal criminal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and only hear criminal cases involving a federal criminal statute or a crime on federal land. See, e.g., ELLEN S. PODGOR, PETER J. HENNING, & NEIL P. COHEN, MAS-TERING CRIMINAL LAW 17 (2008) . Additionally, most federal criminal statutes derive their authority from Congress's Commerce Clause power. See, e.g., id .; see also J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 4-6 (3rd ed. 2011) (discussing federal versus state jurisdiction generally, and specifically in the context of white collar crime). Most gender-based crimes-in particular family violence and sexual violence-do not have the requisite impact on interstate commerce to merit federal statutory sanction. See, e.g., Morrison, (holding that the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act was outside the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power because the underlying conduct, interpersonal violence against women, did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce). See also supra note 3 (discussing Morrison and Lopez). Therefore they are prosecuted in state courts that fall within the states' police power. PODGOR ET AL., supra, at 4. 5 See CHRISTOPHER REINHART, FEDERAL LAW ON CLASSIFYING SEX OFFENDERS (2006) , available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-r-0765.htm (stating all offenders found guilty of "a crime involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another" are considered Tier I offenders under federal law and required to register as sex offenders).
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Tempering Idealism with Realism 315 of law, even if they internally have come to realize their culpability. Thus, in the case of sexual assault in particular, traditional criminal justice processes are unlikely to provide an avenue for promoting acceptance of responsibility by offenders. By contrast, restorative justice initiatives may provide a more effective avenue for offender admission of wrongdoing and consequently enhanced victim recovery.
Restorative justice, broadly defined, is "a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense and to collectively identify and address harms, needs and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible." 6 Restorative justice emphasizes the "needs and roles" of key stakeholders-victims offenders, and communities-7 acknowledges "offender responsibility for repairing harm," 8 and promotes victim, offender, and community engagement in the process. 9 Restorative justice processes are inclusive and collaborative, with "consensual outcomes." 10 The aim is to identify and address the actual harms caused by the offense, and additionally address underlying causes of behavior.
11
In cases of intimate partner violence in state courts-where these cases are most often prosecuted-Bibas's and Bierschbach's proposals might bear more fruit, albeit with several caveats discussed in this Article. More specifically, the avenue for enhancing offender acceptance of responsibility might be present in certain criminal law provisions that domestic violence advocates otherwise rightly target as wrong-headed, namely criminal law domestic violence diversion provisions 12 . Diversion programs allow first-time 13 domestic violence offenders to have their criminal case (or imposition of traditional sanction) held in abeyance, typically in exchange for an agreement to enter a counseling program, and sometimes also in exchange for an 6 HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 37 (2002) . Zehr also explains that "restorative justice is not:" "primarily about forgiveness or reconciliation," "mediation," "primarily designed to reduce recidivism," "necessarily an alternative to prison," or "the opposite of retribution. . 7 Id. Victims need information, truth-telling, empowerment, and restitution or vindication. Id. at 14-15. Offenders, on the other hand, need accountability, "encouragement to experience personal transformation," reintegration into the community, and at times, "temporary restraint." Id. at 17. Members of the community where the crime occurred need recognition that they are also victims, the "opportunit[y] to build a sense of community and mutual accountability," and "encouragement to take on their obligations for the welfare of their members . . . and to foster the conditions that promote healthy communities." Id. at 18. 8 Id. at 21. 9 Id. at 24. 10 Id. at 26. 11 Diversion typically consists of some form of counseling for the offender, quite often a combination of individual and group counseling about the violence, and additional substance abuse counseling if the offender was using drugs or alcohol during or prior to the incident. See infra Part IV.A (discussing diversion). 13 Rarely is the criminally charged domestic abuser a true first-time offender. Based on my experience, victims rarely seek police intervention for a first incident; several incidents of abuse typically occur before a victim's first call to the police.
316
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35 in-court admission of wrongdoing. 14 While the effectiveness of the counseling programs themselves is not demonstrably robust, 15 this does not mean that other potential benefits of diversion necessarily should be ignored or eliminated.
These diversion provisions are convincingly criticized by advocates who argue that diversion treats domestic violence as a less serious matter than stranger assaults and that it treats family violence as a therapeutic matter rather than as a crime, 16 but the programs nonetheless provide a unique opportunity for victims that should not be ignored. This Article analyzes requirements of public admission by batterers of wrongdoing in domestic violence diversion laws and companion provisions that allow victims to make in-court statements about past harm. The claim in this Article is that this process of public truth-telling is a means of restoring history that previously was unwritten through batterers' typical denial of past wrongdoing. The restoration of history effectuated by these laws provides a unique benefit to victims that should not be abandoned, despite other possibly valid feminist critiques of diversion.
Because non-admission of guilt is the norm in our criminal justice system, 17 diversion's provision for batterer public confession may be the only method of restoring the history that he (and occasionally she) 18 16 Although the criticisms are meritorious, they ignore the actual wishes of victims who often say they do not want typical criminal punishment, but rather for the batterer to publicly admit what he did and to make good on promises to change, which they hope will happen through counseling; these are the precise things diversion programs attempt to deliver. See, e.g., Hopkins et al., Applying Restorative Justice, supra unmade. 19 Quite possibly, it may also be the case that, since batterers often resort to apologies as part of their pattern of power and control, their tendency to apologize may well be leveraged in a process that promotes public acceptance of responsibility. This is in contrast with acquaintance sexual assault offenders who are faced with the potential of lifetime sex offender registry, which makes it significantly less likely that they will admit responsibility even once they internally acknowledge their wrongful acts. If that is the case, it should not be lightly tossed aside, but rather should be emphasized and expanded.
20
For many of the same reasons enumerated here, Professor Laurie Kohn has eloquently argued for a radical and visionary creation of a new restorative justice response to intimate partner violence that would stand separate and apart from existing criminal justice responses.
21 While the approach she advocates is arguably a more "pure" restorative justice response, 22 its radical nature makes it less likely to be accepted by key stakeholders (prosecutors, judges dealing with family violence cases, and domestic violence advocates in particular) than the approach argued for in this Article. A non-receptive about the gendered nature of domestic violence. Id. at 38-39 (discussing sociologist Michael Johnson's "typology of domestic violence" consisting of four different types of domestic violence). While the vast majority of domestic violence offenders are male partners in heterosexual relationships, domestic violence does occur in same-sex relationships, and very occasionally involves female perpetrators in heterosexual relationships. This Article does not wish to silence or hide victims in these cases, who suffer equally and differently from what is otherwise the overwhelming majority of female victims in heterosexual intimate violence cases. For a further discussion of intimate partner violence in same-sex relationships, see GOODMARK supra, at 71; Satoka Harada, Comment, Additional Barriers to Breaking the Silence: Issues to Consider when Representing a Victim of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 41 U. BALT. L. F. 150, 155-61 (2011) . 19 See infra Part I.A.2 (highlighting the importance of these confessions taking place in a public rather than private forum). But see Petrucci, supra note 17, at 246 (pointing out potential negative consequences to making confessions in public). One could cogently argue that a public approach over-privileges and over-emphasizes the offender's authority, power, and role in first unwriting (i.e., misstating) and then re-writing (i.e., correcting) history, to the detriment of the survivor's power and role in the endeavor. A more fundamental shift in our constitutional framework and criminal justice system than that argued for in this Article would be required to implement a presumption that endorses the victim's reclaiming of the historical truth-herstory if you will. More importantly, the use of victim impact statements already accomplishes much of this goal of focusing on victim truth-claiming and truth-telling. The value in promoting offender acceptance of responsibility stands separate and apart from that goal, yields benefits to victims and to society more generally, and only enhances deference to victim narrations of the truth of the events. 20 See Petrucci, supra note 17, at 354-58 (presenting empirical evidence that apology should be incorporated in criminal justice proceedings, where apology includes the concepts of acceptance of responsibility for wrongdoing). 21 'Y 571, 602 (2004) (claiming that working within "the traditional adversary system" might "distort" a restorative justice model without "changing the traditional adversarial system").
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Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35 audience alone is not necessarily a sufficient reason to refuse to attempt Professor Kohn's project. However, because her proposed reform moves away from long-fought-for reforms in the criminal justice system, her approach-in contrast to the one argued for here-is more vulnerable to a charge from advocates that it is "justice light" for victims, and that it undercuts advocates' hard-won gains. 23 As a purely logistical and fiscal matter, using the existing criminal justice response infrastructure makes the approach argued for here much more feasible than the visionary program argued for by Kohn. In addition, the approach suggested here will allow for the continued development and study of the outcomes of "coordinated community response" models coupled with "safety and accountability audits," which are deemed best practices in current responses to intimate partner violence and which key stakeholders fear might be side-stepped. 24 This Article thus analyzes the public confession aspect of existing diversion programs as a means of restoring history and achieving some of the other ends Kohn and I agree are so critical for victims. I argue that restoring history, in particular, is a critical companion to victims' own recounting of the past harm either through traditional trial testimony or victim impact statements made at sentencing.
25 After a diversion-based approach has been implemented and studied over a period of time and key stakeholders and victims have positive experiences with it, the Kohn approach is much more likely to be accepted and thus possible to implement.
Part I addresses the need for and benefits from promoting public truthtelling within the legal system. The argument draws on psychological research on recovery from trauma. This section first evaluates the counterpart to offender confession, namely victim impact statements, and how they too contribute to victim healing. This section then focuses on the benefits of offender confession and acceptance of responsibility: (1) 
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Tempering Idealism with Realism 319 tims of gender-based violence as a therapeutic moment; (2) to victims of gender-based violence as a group in terms of increased societal understanding of the phenomena; and finally, (3) potentially to the general public from reductions in gender-based violence which in turn can trigger reductions in other social problems. Part II addresses theoretical bases for incorporating perpetrators' public acceptance of responsibility into the criminal justice processing of genderbased violence cases. This section first analyzes the theory of therapeutic justice before ultimately proposing that restorative justice theory and its practices may prove promising for promoting the goals suggested in this Article. This Part argues that there may be a larger societal benefit from the continued (and perhaps expanded) use of public truth-telling in acquaintance sexual assault and family violence cases.
Part III evaluates feminist theoretical foundations for a criminal justice response that promotes domestic violence offender confession. This section argues that in many ways, a diversion model that incorporates a public truthtelling component sits squarely within not just one, but several central branches of feminist legal theory: (1). Robin West and Carol Gilligan's cultural or difference feminism (as modulated by Martha Chamallas's more recent recasting of this theory) emphasizing the importance of relationships; (2). Catharine MacKinnon's dominance feminism and its emphasis on gender-based power disparities; and (3). Kathy Abrams's and other authors' feminist jurisprudence on women's agency and its potential emphasis on the importance of empowering victims of intimate violence.
This Part then confronts concerns about diversion programs expressed by feminist advocates, highlighting several benefits to incorporating offender apology into the widespread use of diversion. Next, this Part addresses concerns regarding restorative justice's use in domestic violence cases, including real concerns about the perverse role apology plays in the dynamics of intimate violence when used by offenders as a tool to maintain domination over victims and restorative justice's emphasis on reconciliation, which are ignored by many contemporary scholars who argue for the increased use of apology in criminal and civil law. The argument concludes that although use of offender apology to victims in ongoing violent relationships is problematic the system could minimize the harmful effects of apology while still achieving the potential benefits of public acceptance of responsibility.
Finally Not only do state statutory and other regulatory schemes continue to provide for diversion, this Part reviews anecdotal accounts that suggest that prosecutors in a number of states utilize diversion as the primary means of resolving most family violence cases. 29 An evaluation of two such state provisions, Arizona and Virginia, constitutes the focus of the final section of this Part to demonstrate the ways in which use of diversion can differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This discussion concludes, however, that despite the great potential to promote offenders taking responsibility for their violence, the promise remains unfulfilled. In practice, domestic violence offenders rarely, if ever, acknowledge their wrongdoing in the legal forum prior to receiving the benefit of diversion. As this study demonstrates, close attention to the actual implementation of criminal justice initiatives is required to ensure that their promise of promoting public acceptance of responsibility comes to fruition. In all but the narrowest of contexts, the criminal justice system in the United States disincentivizes the admission of wrong-doing and the acceptance of responsibility for criminal behavior.
30 Public truth-telling within the legal system, however, can serve a number of important functions that are beneficial to both individuals and society. After briefly addressing the therapeutic benefits of victim testimony, this Part focuses on the benefits of offender confession and acceptance of responsibility including therapeutic benefits for individual victims, the group benefit to victims from increased societal understanding of intimate partner violence, and finally, to society as a whole from reductions in violence generally. Given the demonstrated corinclude the use of identifying license plates, requiring offenders to wear placards that state their crimes, and so on. 27 
A. Benefits to Individual Victims
Public testimony as to wrongs done, both in the form of victim testimony and offender confession, may serve positive functions in victim healing and social norm change. This section focuses on the first of these two benefits-victim healing-since both victim testimony and offender confession map directly on to the second stage in victim recovery: remembrance and mourning. Psychological studies of trauma and recovery from trauma tell us that human beings need to talk about harms we have suffered in order to heal.
33
Truth-telling about the traumatic events is central to any process of recovery. 34 Although emphasizing that there is no magic bullet for recovery,
35
Harvard psychologist Judith Herman lays out three typical stages necessary to victim recovery from trauma, namely: (1) ensuring victim safety, (2) remembrance and mourning, and (3) reconnecting with others.
36
The first stage of recovery from trauma-reestablishing control and a sense of safety-focuses both on insuring self-reliant physical safety and emotional security. 37 This stage emphasizes victims regaining power and control over themselves and their environment, including such basic processes as sleeping. 38 In the context of criminal prosecution, the demands 31 See discussion and sources cited infra Part I.C. 32 See JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 175 (1992) . 33 See id. at 181 (discussing the power of storytelling in the process of healing); CHARLES L. WHITFIELD, M.D., MEMORY AND ABUSE: REMEMBERING AND HEALING THE EFFECTS OF TRAUMA 250-51 (1995) (summarizing several studies on stages of PTSD recovery and noting that all involve some form of remembering and naming the experience). This is not to say that there are not some who prefer instead to turn their back on the traumatic event, and stoically go forward with their lives rather than reliving their trauma through testimony. Some of those who choose that path, however, may not be taking this path because they see it as the healthy option. Some may want to avoid dwelling on the past, while others may not want to reveal the traumatic experience because they feel shame about it. See Herman, supra note 32, at 158-59 (describing reasons patients avoid psychotherapy after traumatic events Criminal processes, with their own constitutionally and institutionally driven time-table, may force victims to move more quickly at this stage than is psychologically advisable.
41
The second stage of recovery from trauma identified by Herman involves a process of remembrance of the traumatic act, coupled with mourning losses that the trauma entailed. 42 This stage emphasizes victim testimony and remembrance, but also suggests the possibility that offender confession might facilitate victim recovery. 43 It is this second stage that most directly calls for justice system responses that facilitate testimony and confession.
44 39 See id. at 165 (describing the legal system as "hostile" or "indifferent" to a survivor). 40 Id. at 168. Herman emphasizes the difficulty of establishing safety in relationships with ongoing violence. Id. For example, she explains that offenders in these cases will make promises to reform and victims will sometimes be particularly willing to accept these promises even to the extent of denying or minimizing the ongoing danger. Id. 41 Id. at 165. 42 Id. at 175, 188. 43 Cf. id. at 175-81 (enumerating several difficulties in the process of remembering and retelling trauma as part of the recovery process, many of which come from uncertainty about the facts of the traumatic episode). But see id. at 189-90 (suggesting offender confession is not a prerequisite to victim recovery). 44 What is the impact of divergent memories (and thus, divergent testimonies) on any endeavor to use public confessions and testimony as a therapeutic and restorative event, i.e., when victim and defendant's public statements speak different "truths?" This Article does not address situations where parties present divergent accounts of the same event because either the perpetrator or the victim affirmatively and intentionally misrepresents what he or she knows to be true-what might be characterized as the "easy" scenario where one or the other is simply lying. Although I leave this scenario for analysis in other venues, I use scare quotes around the term "easy" because part of what may underlie our anxiety with divergent stories is the very real prospect that one or the other party is in fact affirmatively and intentionally speaking untruthfully.
For purposes of this Article, I focus not on situations where the perpetrator denies anything happened, but rather on those situations in the grey interstices where both parties agree generally that something happened but disagree on the specifics of the event(s). The more complex scenario between victims and offenders involves those situations where the parties tell diverging stories, both honestly believing their version is the accurate one. Studies of memory function in general, and autobiographic memory in particular, reveal that this can and does happen regularly simply by virtue of the neural processes that occur when we encode and store memories in our brains. See WHITFIELD, supra note 33, at 13-14 (describing the process of memory experience and encoding).
I also assume a unitary phenomenology and that divergent human accounts of that reality reflect something that occurs on an individual level, whether this be individualistic experiences of reality, individualistic expressions of that experience, or something in between. Post-modern theorists, like Teresa de Lauretis and Joan W. Scott, challenge the common-sense notion that experiences are "direct, unmediated, subjectively lived accounts of reality . . . , 1999) . As post-modern theorists would have it, experience is something that subjects do, rather than merely something a subject has. Experience "is not so direct and unmediated as is usually assumed, but is fundamentally discursive." Id. For victims, an experience of trauma triggers a loss of both language and the realization that language itself can be a critical tool for addressing trauma. 45 Because trauma can, at least temporarily, rob the victim of language, 46 overcoming trauma requires regaining language. Overcoming trauma requires speech. 47 In this sense, trauma ultimately can end up multidepends on discourse to come about; forms of experience do not just depend on the event or history that is being experienced, but also on the discourse in which the event is expressed/thought/conceptualized." Id.
It is also important to note, before moving on to the more difficult analysis of sincere but diverging stories, that diversion itself may trigger incidents of false or insincere confessions. Since diversion offers a way to make the whole matter virtually disappear, there is a great incentive for false or insincere confessions where a guilty plea is a prerequisite to getting diversion. The wish to make a bad situation just go away is perhaps even part of the human condition. The protagonist in J. M. Coetzee's compelling novel, Disgrace, states the problem succinctly: "I plead guilty to both charges. Pass sentence, and let us get on with our lives." J.M. COETZEE, DISGRACE 48 (1999) . See also PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW & LITERATURE 21-22 (2000) (explaining motivations for false confessions). Some research suggests, however, that the mere act of accepting responsibility, even if insincere, might nonetheless prove beneficial to both victim and offender. See, e.g., Petrucci, supra note 17, at 355-56 (discussing motivations to accept apologies, even if that apology is insincere). Note, of course, that "insincere" acceptance of responsibility or expressions of remorse are not the same as "untrue" confessions. It is arguable that an "untrue" confession may not provide the same kind of benefit to a victim that an insincere apology would.
45 HERMAN, supra note 32, at 175 ("Traumatic memory . . . is wordless and static."). As Herman notes, the process of recovery incorporates a process of identifying and naming the trauma itself, which in the therapist's office equates with diagnosis. 54-55 (1985) . Paul Celan, poet and Holocaust survivor, described his traumatic experience thus:
Within reach, close and not lost, there remained, in the midst of the losses, this one thing: language. This, the language, was not lost but remained, yes, in spite of everything. But it had to pass through its own answerlessness, pass through a frightful falling mute, pass through the thousand darknesses of death-bringing speech. 1982, at 21, 23) . Felman noticed a similar reaction in her students, after showing them traumatic images of the Holocaust: "[The students' experience] was, not unlike Celan's own Holocaust experience, something akin to a loss of language; and even though [they] came out of it with a deep need to talk about it and to talk it out, [they] also felt that language was somehow incommensurate with it." Id. at 50.
47 HERMAN, supra note 32, at 175. Felman describes this phenomenon in relation to the trauma of the Holocaust:
To seek reality through language "with one's very being," to seek in language what the language had precisely to pass through, is thus to make of one's own "shelterlessness"-of the openness and the accessibility of one's own woundsan unexpected and unprecedented means of accessing reality, the radical condition for a wrenching exploration of the testimonial function, and the testimonial power, of the language . . . . Felman, supra note 46, at 28-29. Later in the chapter, when Felman describes the secondary trauma the class undergoes after watching the testimony of Holocaust survivors, she states: "The [students] looked subdued and kept their silence even as they left . . . .
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35 plying speech, if language is used as a tool in recovering from that trauma. 48 This may come in the form of regaining voice in the first instance-the ability to speak or write about the events-to put words to the experience. Or it may be that entirely new language needs to be learned to describe the traumatic event-the new reality, as it were, of the victim's post-trauma world. Testimonial accounts enable "psychological survival-the very ability to sustain and to continue life after catastrophes." 49 The public act of testifying about the harm done to a victim-whether through testimony at trial, a victim impact statement, or another public or quasi-public forumcan play a role in that persons's recovery from trauma.
50
With victim testimony, this reclaiming of language and movement towards overcoming trauma must in the first instance be the responsibility and prerogative of the victim. 51 In other words, prosecutors' accounts of the incidents of violence serve little therapeutic function. It is theft, a pre-emption of the right to witness, when prosecutors recount the traumatic events on victims' behalf. " [T] estimony cannot be simply relayed, repeated or reported by another without thereby losing its function as a testimony . . . [it] is a radically unique, non-interchangeable and solitary burden." 52 However, if witnessed (in the both strict and loose senses of that word), the act of testifying overcomes the witness's sense of isolation.
53
What was unusual was that the experience did not end in silence, but instead, fermented into endless and relentless talking in the days and weeks to come . . . ." Id. at 47.
48 Thank you to Professor Chris Roederer for this insight. 49 Shoshana Felman & Dori Laub, Introduction, in TESTIMONY, supra note 46, at xvii. 50 Testimony is not, however, unproblematic. Although it may be beneficial to the primary victims to be able to recount the harm done, one of the dangers of testimony, of re-telling trauma, is that hearing the testimony will create further trauma in those who hear it. See, e.g., Dori Laub, Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening, in TESTI-MONY, supra note 46, at 57-58. Secondary post-traumatic stress is not unusual for those working with victims of trauma. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 32, at 140-47 (discussing what is in essence secondary post-traumatic stress disorder). "By extension, the listener to the trauma comes to be a participant and a co-owner of the traumatic event: through his very listening, he comes to partially experience trauma in himself." Laub, supra, at 57. The initial trauma continues to ripple outward, potentially causing a tertiary level of trauma. Secondary-trauma victims experience the same initial loss of language and then the compelling need to use language to deal with their emotions. See Felman, supra note 46, at 47-52. In Felman's case, hearing the original testimony gave the students who heard it a further need to talk about the experience extensively to family and friends, who might in turn experience trauma in the retelling. Id.
51 Felman, supra note 46, at 3 ("'If someone else could have written my stories,' says Elie Wiesel, 'I would not have written them. I have written them in order to testify.'"). 52 Id. 53 See id. Presenting a cultural studies account of memory, Mieke Bal makes a similar point. Mieke Bal, Introduction to ACTS OF MEMORY, supra note 44, at vii-viii. Bal describes three types of memory: 1) "unreflective, habitual" (what keeps you from stepping into a puddle); 2) "narrative memor[y]" ("affectively colored, surrounded by an emotional aura that, precisely, makes them memorable"); and 3) "traumatic recall" or "traumatic memory" ("the painful resurfacing of events of a traumatic nature"). Id. at viii. Bal agrees with Felman and Laub that traumatic memories need to be "legitimized and narratively integrated in order to lose their hold over the subject who suffered the traumatizing event in the past." Id. This need to integrate past trauma into present narrative confirms the importance of cultural memory in the process for several reasons 2012]
Tempering Idealism with Realism 325
Having the opportunity to speak is particularly important when the acts done to us are enveloped in a norm of silence, such as in the case of incest, 54 domestic violence, 55 or rape. 56 As renowned trauma expert Judith Lewis Herman states: "In refusing to hide or be silenced, in insisting that rape is a public matter, and in demanding social change, survivors create their own living monument."
57 Giving victims the opportunity to tell their story in some capacity is critical to their healing from that trauma. Some victims prefer to tell their stories somewhere other than in court, such as in a therapist's office, but for others, the legal system provides several opportunities for such therapeutic events. 58 In the context of a criminal trial for domestic violence or sexual assault, not only may victims testify at trial, but they are often allowed to provide a victim impact statement-another opportunity for victim allocution-at sentencing. 
Offender Allocution: Acknowledgment of the Wrongful Act as a Component of Victim Recovery
In addition to having the opportunity to publicly recount his or her traumatic experience, hearing a public acknowledgment of wrongdoing by the offender can also aid victim recovery. 60 For victims of domestic violence, public admission of wrongdoing by the offender can serve to undo the denial of violence in which many perpetrators engage. That is, as part of the dynamics of violent intimate relationships, many batterers verbally minimize including: 1) because need to integrate is current, "in this sense, trauma can paradoxically stand for the importance of cultural memory;" and 2) having a "confirming witness to a painfully elusive past confirms a notion of memory that is not confined to the individual psyche, but is constituted in the culture in which the traumatized subject lives," making memory into "an exchange between first and second person that sets in motion the emergence of narrative." Id. at x. Bal's collection contends, as do Felman's and Laub's to a certain extent, "that the incapacitation of the subject-whose trauma or wound precludes memory as a healing integration-can be overcome only in an interaction with others" who, though "often a therapist," can be "whoever functions as the 'second person' before or to whom the traumatized subject can bear witness, and thus integrate narratively what was until then an assailing specter." Id. at x-xi. 54 See, e.g., MOIRA JOHNSTON, SPECTRAL EVIDENCE: THE RAMONA CASE: INCEST, MEMORY AND TRUTH ON TRIAL IN NAPA VALLEY 115-18 (1997) (quoting sections of Holly Ramona's letter detailing her memories of incest and detailing how the process of writing helped her cope with her newfound memories).
55 HERMAN, supra note 32, at 2 (discussing the increase in victims coming forward to help recover from domestic violence as part of the women's liberation movement). 56 See, e.g., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 2 (1987) (" [B] eing raped is something you simply don't talk about. . . . If it isn't my fault, why am I supposed to be ashamed? If I'm not ashamed, if it wasn't 'personal,' why look askance when I mention it? And so I mention it.").
57 HERMAN, supra note 32, at 73. 58 See Cassell, supra note 25, at 621-23 (describing therapeutic benefits to victims who deliver impact statements). 59 See id. 60 See Petrucci, supra note 17, at 351-52 (noting that apologies promote healing by increasing victims' self-esteem and reducing anger towards the offender). [Vol. 35 the violence they perpetrate, blame the violence on the victim herself, and at times even outright deny it ever took place. 61 They engage in this denial, minimization, and transferral of blame not only in their interactions with the victim, friends, and family, but also at times they even deny to themselves the seriousness of the violence or their responsibility for it. 62 Since domestic violence rarely occurs in front of witnesses, a batterer's outward denial typically stands in direct opposition to the victim's assertion that the violence occurred. Family and friends typically must choose whom to believe. Not witnessing the violence themselves, those around the victim often disbelieve her. 63 Believing the offender's version of events is characteristically consistent with many of the outward signs and behaviors of the batterer who may present as charming and non-violent to all but his partner. 64 Additionally, believing the offender tends to be the easier route for family and friends than accepting that someone close to them has harmed another person close to them. 65 Acknowledging the violence in a public forum thus undercuts, although not entirely disrupts, the offender's ability to deny the prior violence and to get away with future violence so easily. It is also the case that this offender allocution may aid the victim in the final stage of recovery, which entails reconnection between the victim/survivor and those around her. 66 As discussed in the following section, notions of restorative justice emphasize the importance of relationships and connections, as well as the manner in which legal processes can assist in this final stage of recovery from this type of trauma.
Further, on both a therapeutic and a symbolic level, a public admission can serve as a vindication for the victim that the violence she suffered was real, which can aid in her recovery. 
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Tempering Idealism with Realism 327 condemnation do we have in the United States than that which is exemplified by our criminal justice system? While a conviction alone may send this message, and a statement from the bench acknowledging the wrongfulness of the offender's conduct may as well, the offender's public admission has symbolic value and can further aid a victim in her healing process-particularly in the final stage of recovery mentioned above and the reconnection of relationships disrupted by the crime(s). 68 Those within the victim's community who may have begun to doubt the violence or to blame the victim for the violence may be less likely-after offender allocution-to think she either lied about, exaggerated, or at worst, somehow caused the violence. In turn, as a consequence of offender allocution, those in the community may see the victim in a more positive light. This in turn may lead to a reconnection of disrupted relationships between the victim and her community.
Finally, in some violent intimate relationships, a pattern of denial by the offender is interrupted by a period of remorse and acknowledgment of the violence; this is sometimes coupled with an apology from the offender for his violent acts.
69 Often, however, as is true with the violence itself, this contrition takes place only in front of the victim, and not when others are present. That way, the offender retains his ability to deny the violence to others. By contrast, a public admission leaves him in a position where denying past violence becomes almost impossible.
B. Benefits to Victims as a Group
Victims as a group may also benefit when offenders publicly admit to violence against their intimate partners. Until recently the general public (including actors within the criminal justice system) engaged in a form of denial as well. 70 Until domestic violence advocates spearheaded research initiatives, public education campaigns, and the reformation of criminal laws 68 HERMAN, supra note 32, at 196-97. I do not mean to suggest that a victim's recovery is dependent upon an offender's acceptance of responsibility or apology, and certainly Herman is not suggesting this either. However, in some cases, it might be of some benefit to a victim to hear her abuser's public acceptance of responsibility as part of her healing process, especially if it fully confirms her own account of the harm she suffered. It might possibly also awaken compassion in her friends and family for the experience she has endured. 69 See, e.g., Waits, supra note 62, at 291-95 (describing Lenore Walker's theory of the cycle of violence in battering relationships); see also GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 31-40 (describing the cycle of violence, the power and control wheel, and development of the theory of coercive control at the core of intimate partner abuse rather than a definitive cycle of violence). 70 Hopkins, supra note 61, at 422 (noting an "increasingly widespread and concerted effort over the past two decades to combat the problem of family violence on a level perhaps not present in these prior reform movements"). But see id. at 419-21 (pointing out that awareness of and legal responses to domestic violence are not merely recent phenomena, but have recurred at various points during past centuries). [Vol. 35 and procedures for intimate violence, the problem of domestic violence was virtually invisible.
71
Although much has changed in this regard over the past few decades, regular public admissions of violence can continue to undercut ongoing denial by police, prosecutors, judges, and society at large. This practice of denial is further exacerbated by film and other media coverage that focuses on the most outrageous forms of family violence (e.g., the trial of O.J. Simpson for the murder of his wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and that of Susan Smith for the murder of her children), 72 rather than the more common types of family violence that comprise the bulk of intimate abuse. For victims as a group, then, increased societal awareness of the reality of "ordinary" domestic violence might help other individual victims. First responders-primarily law enforcement-might take victims seriously, and ultimately jurors might believe their stories. Further, this increased awareness may serve to reduce the marginalization and stigmatization of victims of intimate violence as weak, masochistic, similarly violent, or mentally ill.
73

C. Benefits to Society in General
Finally, society in general can benefit from the implementation of a system that encourages rather than discourages public acceptance of responsibility for intimate violence.
74 First, simultaneous but separate efforts that expose the reality of abuse by undercutting denial of the problem can strengthen educational efforts aimed at reducing the prevalence of domestic abuse.
Second, and more importantly (although more attenuated and as yet untested), public acceptance of responsibility by offenders can support and enhance other processes that aim to interrupt offending patterns, such as domestic violence counseling and batterer intervention programs. Requiring batterers to admit to their behavior can help initiate the steps towards permanent behavioral change. In other words, public truth-telling may ultimately prevent future reoffending by the confessing individual, thus reducing overall prevalence rates of intimate violence. In addition, others who witness the public admission are both on notice and better equipped to confront future offending behavior and hold the offender accountable. Further, if an individual offender who lives in a home with male children (whether his own or others') does not reoffend, this may interrupt the documented inter-genera- 71 See id. at 419-23 (describing the evolution of the domestic violence advocacy movement over time). 72 See GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 54-55 (describing the evolution of the "stereotypical" image of domestic violence). In my opinion, race played a role in the high profile nature of the O.J. Simpson trial, while gender-a murdering mother?!-likely played a role in the coverage of the Susan Smith murder trial.
73 GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 55-56; Waits, supra note 62, at 279-80. 74 Discussing the benefits of public truth-telling in contexts other than intimate violence is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Tempering Idealism with Realism 329 tional transmission of acts of violence against intimates and norms supporting that behavior. 75 This potentially reduces prevalence rates over time exponentially rather than just on a case-by-case basis.
An important caveat is in order. Batterer intervention programs have not yet proven themselves consistently and robustly effective. 76 To the extent they have been shown to change an individual batterer's use of physical violence, batterers often simply resort to other methods of abuse, such as increased verbal abuse or increased control of their partners' activities.
77 As many victims acknowledge, these emotional and psychological tactics are often also harmful and difficult to recover from.
78
Despite the lack of proven effectiveness for batterer intervention and despite the fact that these programs might be effective even if batterers do not admit at the outset of the program that they have a problem, the intervention process in general is consistent with other similar forms of intervention for behavioral problems. Twelve-step programs like Alcoholics Anonymous or Gamblers Anonymous are not effective unless the person with the problem first acknowledges he or she has the problem. 79 Certainly denial of the problem, typical of perpetrators of intimate partner violence, does not help with offender reform. But even in the case of a subsequent retraction or minimization of the prior offending behavior, the previous admission puts everyone else on notice that there is indeed a problem. Even if the offender does not internally reform, others can help increase surveillance and impose secondary social sanctions for abusers who fall back into offending behaviors, be it physical or emotional violence.
Finally, if public truth-telling can in fact reduce the prevalence of intimate violence for the reasons just discussed, society will benefit by the reduction of a host of other social and public health problems proven to be associated with intimate violence. 80 Victims of intimate violence and their children tend to have a higher prevalence of psychological and physical 75 See Waits, supra note 62, at 288 (stating that battering behavior often is a learned behavior transmitted inter-generationally).
76 GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 148-50. This is not to say that they might not yet prove to be effective. Maryland, for instance, has only recently implemented quality control over batterer intervention programs when it transferred authority to oversee these programs to Governor' act as a therapeutic or an anti-therapeutic agent. 86 Restorative justice ("RJ") is a similar movement with more ancient roots that has reemerged in contemporary criminal justice practice and scholarship. In contemporary scholarship, RJ is defined and practiced in a number of ways, but is perhaps best summarized by Kathleen Daly and R. Immarigeon as follows: "The concept may refer to an alternative process for resolving disputes, to alternative sanctioning options, or to a distinctly different, 'new' mode of criminal justice organized around principles of restoration to victims, offenders, and the communities in which they live." 87 RJ is similar to TJ in some aspects, and in fact, one scholar has intentionally merged the two strains of thought into what he terms Restorative Therapeutic Jurisprudence ("RTJ"). RJ differs from TJ, however, in some ways relevant to this discussion.
A. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Mental health law served as the primary focus of early incarnations of TJ. 88 The movement has now spread well beyond mental commitments and dealing with mentally ill or addicted persons, and touches on tort, criminal, contract, and property law. 89 In general, TJ covers "four overlapping areas of inquiry:" 90 "(1) the role of the law in producing psychological dysfunction, (2) therapeutic aspects of legal rules, (3) therapeutic aspects of legal procedures, and (4) therapeutic aspects of judicial and legal roles."
91
Regardless of which area of inquiry one surveys, TJ's analysis of these four areas maintains a primary, if not exclusive, focus on therapeutic benefits of the legal system for offenders rather than for victims, a distinction of central importance to this discussion.
92
A simple example of a TJ analysis is that the failure of law enforcement or courts to take appropriate action after an incident of domestic violence could be anti-therapeutic if it encourages the belief that abusive behavior is acceptable, thus exacerbating the offender's cognitive distortion of socially acceptable behavior. By contrast, a judge's statement to an offender at sen- 96 On the other hand, courtrooms can serve as educational fora: "A court of law is the best place our system has for educating the public. . . . It gets people to think. After courtroom battles, laws are passed. Books are written." 97 The public being educated includes not only family and friends, but also the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, court personnel, and any other observers. As with the advantages of public confession discussed in the preceding section, an educated audience is more likely to hold offenders accountable for future offending.
B. Restorative Justice
Related to and yet different from this therapeutic jurisprudence approach is the concept of restorative justice, which has gained increased attention in the United States and elsewhere in recent years. 98 There are a number of restorative justice models, but they can roughly be broken into three categories: victim-offender mediation, (family group or community) conferencing, and sentencing circles. Restorative justice is typically contrasted with retributive justice, which focuses on "public vengeance, deterrence, and punishment through an adversarial process . . . ."
109 Under a retributive justice model, offender accountability is characterized as "taking punishment," while restorative justice defines accountability as "assuming responsibility and taking action to repair harm." 110 Unlike TJ, RJ focuses not just on offenders, but is equally-if not more so-concerned with victims. As can be seen from the principles of RJ outlined above, victim recovery and offender accountability are, in fact, two linchpins of restorative justice.
111 In this way, restorative justice is more in line with the proposal being made here, that offenders' public statements of responsibility are an important aid to victim recovery.
In addition, restorative justice emphasizes the impact of crime on a community, and the need for a justice response to repair those communityrelated harms. There are two ways a system that encourages a batterer to publicly accept responsibility can work to repair community-related harms. First, as discussed at the beginning of this Article, part of the direct harm to the victim from an offender's denial of the violence is that she is thereby often cut off from her immediate community-family and friends-who might believe his story rather than hers. His public statements of accountability may serve to restore her connections with those closest to her. This restoration of connections to support networks is particularly important for battered women, since quite often batterers directly isolate their victims as a strategy for maintaining control. 112 The second way that this approach can repair community harm is that it can inform the community about the realities of domestic violence, with the ultimate benefits discussed at the beginning of this Article, including reducing crime and increasing public health. 113 Similarly, and again in contrast with therapeutic jurisprudence, which typically emphasizes individual treatment, the foregoing principles demonstrate that "restorative justice is concerned with the broader relationships among offenders, victims, and the community."
114 Restorative justice em- 108 Id. at 93-95. 109 OJJDP, supra note 98, at 6; see also NICHOLL, supra note 99, at 5. Restorative justice is also sometimes contrasted with community justice, which stands for the proposition that responses to crime must not ignore the needs or expectations of the community. See, e.g., NICHOLL, supra note 99, at 5, 89. 110 OJJDP, supra note 98, at 7. 111 NICHOLL, supra note 99, at 91 (citing HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 177-214 (1990) ).
112 GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 35. 113 See discussion supra Part I. 114 OJJDP, supra note 98, at 6; see generally NICHOLL, supra note 99 (describing the community-based approach of restorative justice).
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Tempering Idealism with Realism 335 phasizes victim, offender, and community involvement in the judicial process of dealing with wrongdoing. 115 Increased victim involvement in this process enhances victim satisfaction. 116 Restorative justice further aims to promote offender accountability, which enhances victim satisfaction and helps promote victims' recovery from the crimes committed against them.
117
Two of the central yardsticks of restorative justice models outlined above mirror the twin truth-telling devices discussed in this Article: victim impact statements and diversion's (occasional) requirement of public acceptance of responsibility. These yardsticks are: (1) "victims have sufficient opportunities to tell their truth to relevant listeners"; and (2) 118 Where an offender is required to allocute or at least acknowledge guilt in order to get the benefit of diversion, the legal system acts in accordance with restorative justice principles.
Additionally, the impact of crime is understood broadly in the restorative justice model. The impact on victims is understood to be not just physical and/or financial, but also implicates victims' psychologically.
119
Traditional retributive justice ignores much of the impact on the victim, and particularly the intangible emotional impact. Encouraging offenders to publicly acknowledge wrongdoing can get at the emotional and psychological needs of victims in a way that mere incarceration cannot. It is possible that the public admission of responsibility including an apology from the offender might further lead to a victim's psychological and spiritual healing (if relevant or important to her), in that apologies may inspire victims to forgive offenders. As discussed in the next section, however, the role of apologies and forgiveness in violent intimate relationships is problematic in a way different from other victim-based crimes, thus compromising the possible benefit of apologies for domestic violence victims.
III. FEMINIST THEORY AND ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTIMATE VIOLENCE
In this section, I explore the relationship between promoting a public truth-telling approach to domestic violence and feminist jurisprudence generally. I then address the specific feminist concerns about applying restorative justice to violence against women. 
A. Dovetailing Feminist Jurisprudence and a Public TruthTelling Approach to Domestic Violence
Three strands of feminist theory support a legal system response that accords merit to the approach proposed here. These three strands-cultural feminism, dominance feminism, and what I will refer to as "agency feminism"-are discussed below. Each of these feminisms supports the approach in a similar way.
120
First, and perhaps most controversially, cultural feminism (sometimes called difference feminism) aligns with a legal response that promotes public truth-telling. Cultural feminists emphasize the importance of listening to women's voices and giving heed to their specific calls for action. Robin West, for instance, argues in her central article on cultural feminism that women tell different stories than men do and that historically the legal system has neither responded to them nor been structured to accommodate their telling.
121 Others argue that although West's characterization of women as essentially different from men-whether one believes this difference is the result of cultural or natural forces-may be problematic and questionable, the central thrust of West's argument holds merit. That is, those values stereotypically associated with women, such as nurturing or relationship-building or narrative story-telling and so on, are typically under-valued in society and in the legal system.
122
Regardless of which view of cultural feminism one considers, it is clear that each argues for listening to and responding to the specific requests of those who suffer the injury. In other words, in the context of legal response to intimate violence, the criminal justice system should be structured so as to best heed the voices of the victims of the harmful activity, rather than to some other abstract demands of criminal justice theory. In addition, public confessions by perpetrators that corroborate the victims' statements of harm will give added reinforcement to women's voices. This is not to say that this latter addition is necessary to comport with cultural feminism's call, but it does not hurt.
In a different way, dominance feminism supports the approach advocated here. Catharine MacKinnon and others have eloquently argued that our legal system is patriarchal, and built on constructs of male power and domination over women.
123 MacKinnon herself may be skeptical of listen- ing uncritically to women's voices, as they can be already distorted or tainted by these underlying sexist structures. 124 She may even be skeptical of a call for offender public truth-telling as taking power from women and placing it squarely back in the hands of the offender.
125 However-and pointedly, drawing on MacKinnon's work-scholars and advocates working in the area of intimate violence have made cogent arguments that the reason intimate violence continues is that it is bolstered by (and bolsters) a legal system designed to protect men's power. That is, the legal system's failure to hold batterers accountable for their violence simply reflects men's power-preservation efforts, and intimate violence itself is a specific tool to help maintain both individual and general control over women and women's autonomy.
126
As a result of the ubiquity and power of MacKinnon's central thesis, domestic violence advocates in the United States quickly allied themselves with law and order advocates, and began pushing for harsher penalties, consistent arrests, and prosecution of all incidents of domestic violence.
127
However, one result of this emphasis has been to ignore the actual voices of the women allegedly being oppressed by the violence. This is not to say that mandatory arrest and pro-prosecution or mandatory-prosecution policies are completely wrong-headed. It is to say, however, that to enact these procriminal punishment policies without also enacting companion policies that respond to victims' pleas for action that encourage offenders' acceptance of wrongdoing is wrong-headed and counter-feminist.
Elizabeth Schneider and Kathy Abrams have written on agency feminism, which further supports an approach that gives power to the voices of victims by enacting reforms that incorporate messages from those voices. Theory, 7(3) SIGNS 515, 529 (her original theoretical piece on dominance feminism). For a more extended discussion of MacKinnon's dominance feminism in the context of gender-based violence, see Hopkins & Koss, Incorporating Feminist Theory, supra note 1; see also GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 10-15 (discussing MacKinnon's dominance feminism and critiques thereof). 124 See MacKinnon, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 123, at 114. 125 See, e.g., Ellen C. DuBois et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 72 (1985) (describing MacKinnon's position that women are able to seek empowerment, and may use the state to do so).
126 MacKinnon made the argument in the context of sexual harassment and rape, and has been interpreted as viewing domestic violence "as a subset of sexual victimization of women . . . ." GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 14 (discussing and citing MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 123, at 178).
127 Interview with Professor Kathleen Daly, criminologist (Feb. 28, 2006) . Professor Daly is a criminologist in Australia who has been a long-time researcher on the use of restorative justice and gender. She observed that advocates in the United States were much more aligned with prosecution than in Australia, where advocates chose to ally with social service providers first and foremost. For another discussion of the "strange bedfellows" U.S. advocates have made, see GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 15-16. Professor Goodmark also discusses "governance feminism," an emerging conceptual branch of feminism not discussed here. Id. Schneider's original thesis on battered women's agency, although focused primarily on ways in which battered women act to survive in the context of a violent relationship rather than their demands of the legal system, nonetheless provides a classic example of how agency theory dovetails with a public truth-telling approach to intimate violence.
129
Is it possible that a feminist response to violence against women could be and look different from a response designed by victims of that violence?
130 I think not. MacKinnon's views aside, for it to be so is to fly in the face of the central goal of each of the aforementioned feminist lines of thought: that legal harms that ignore women's demands are harmful to women and therefore should be excoriated. Promoting public truth-telling by domestic violence offenders responds to survivors' explicit requests for such an act.
131 From the perspective of victims generally, studies indicate that primarily, what they want is not punishment in the form of a fine or incarceration, but rather for the offender to acknowledge what he or she did and to accept responsibility for that act.
132 While victims of intimate violence preliminarily want the violence itself to stop, 133 they also often want an opportunity to speak about what has happened to them and for the batterer to acknowledge the wrongful acts and accept responsibility for those acts. Handle Mistakes?, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2565 , 2566 (1996 (citing that ninetyeight percent of patient respondents expect or desire acknowledgement of physician error).
133 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 61, at 20; Des Rosiers, supra note 132, at 437. My own experience with victims also revealed this phenomenon. See generally sources cited supra note 1 (referencing sources that document victims' wish that the violence stop and for batterers to admit wrongdoing).
134 Hopkins et al., Applying Restorative Justice, supra note 1, at 291; Hopkins, supra note 61, at 436; see also Frederick & Lizdas, supra note 24, at 33-34 (noting that most women do not want the men who batter them to be penalized, and critiquing some battered women's programs for insisting on an approach that emphasizes separation from the abuser, which merely replaces one view of what she should do-that of the battererwith another, that of the program); cf. Coker, supra note 103, at 67-73 (discussing Navajo Peacemaking as a justice approach that avoids forcing women to choose between competing loyalties and identities); see generally Koss, Blame, Shame, supra note 1 (discussing the victim's ability to ask for and likely receive an apology from her abuser in communitarian models).
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women must consider and, where possible, map onto survivors' expressed preferences for redress.
135
B. Specific Feminist Concerns About Diversion and Restorative Justice
It is important to note that there are feminist concerns about the use of "diversion" as a response to domestic violence. As discussed further in Part III, diversion refers to the criminal justice system's practice of shifting criminally-charged defendants from a track headed towards trial to other programs, often focusing on treatment or monitoring.
136 Diversion is typically used for those without long criminal histories, or those offenders believed to have offended due to some underlying mental health or addiction problem.
137
Either of these categories of offenders is thought to be both less deserving of traditional criminal punishment such as jail time, and also to be more amenable to treatment to avoid recidivism. As is true with diversion, applying restorative justice to domestic violence cases also triggers feminist concerns, albeit somewhat different ones. 138 The central concerns as to both diversion and restorative justice are addressed below.
Concerns about Diversion
The primary criticism of diversion in cases of domestic violence is that diversion is a soft response to intimate violence as compared with stranger violence; further, unlike other instances where diversion is used-notably drug and alcohol offenses and juvenile offenses-the central component of most diversion programs, counseling, has not proven effective in preventing recidivism of individual batterers.
139 I addressed this latter, narrower criticism earlier, 140 but the central three-pronged point is worth emphasizing here.
First, while it is true that diversion is an option typically used for those who are violent towards individuals they know, the fact is that there is a difference between stranger violence and intimate violence, and the legal system's response should be cognizant of that fact. This is not to say that the 340 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35 law should be more lenient towards batterers who know their victims; in our retributive system, one could argue just the opposite-that hitting someone you are supposed to take care of and love is more morally culpable than hitting a stranger, and thus deserving of greater punishment. In fact, specific enhanced statutory penalties for repeat acts of family violence have been enacted in some jurisdictions. 141 However, one can support the potential benefits of diversion for first-time offenders and still support those enhanced penalties for repeat offenders.
The central thrust of the criticism as to lenient treatment of first-time batterers still remains. Arguably, a primary aim of the advocacy community in spearheading efforts that increased penalties for domestic violence was not just to prevent recidivism of an individual batterer, but more importantly, to change society's view of domestic violence from something to brush under the rug to something that is serious. If general attitudes change in this manner, the argument goes, a larger societal environment that does not tolerate intimate violence will in time result in a reduction in the overall prevalence rate. If diversion is seen as a soft legal response to domestic violence, then the already slow process of social norm change will be even further hampered.
Second, however, there is currently no evidence that incarceration is more effective than counseling at preventing recidivism of an individual offender beyond short-term incapacitation. There is also no evidence that incarceration operates as a general deterrent to other batterers, or leads to the norm changes discussed above. If it did, then we would expect to see recidivism rates that are lower for defendants who were incarcerated than those who were not. But that is not the case.
142 Third, even if the theory behind enhancing penalties for domestic violence were valid and the results of studies of batterer's counseling programs remained inconclusive, so long as diversion remains our legal system's primary response to domestic violence, we should press it to better serve individual victims' and the larger community's needs. Requiring acceptance of responsibility more frequently for entry into diversion represents a primary example of this.
Concerns about Restorative Justice Responses Applied to Domestic Violence Cases
There are a number of practical concerns expressed about the application of restorative justice to cases of domestic violence. First, victims of ongoing domestic abuse may fear confronting or speaking in front of their abusers; due to the overarching power and control dynamic present in many violent intimate relationships, victims may be silenced and unable to speak the truth about what happened to them. Second, restorative justice could create the opportunity for additional violence by the abuser against the battered woman. Third, advocates question the use of coerced apology as an appropriate legal response to intimate violence. Finally, feminists express concern that there is an overemphasis on reconciliation in restorative justice. The first two concerns are dealt with briefly, while the final two are treated more in depth.
As to a victim's fears of confronting or speaking in front of an abuser, any restorative justice response to domestic violence must lay this option squarely in the hands of the victim. One of the central tenets of the relevant type of restorative justice discussed herein is that it is a victim-centered process. If the victim is not given the right to veto the process (i.e., to instead pursue traditional prosecution), then the process is not truly a restorative justice approach.
143 With respect to victim impact statements in particular (which can be viewed as a quasi-restorative justice option), victims are not required to make them. Further, most victim impact statements can be submitted in writing, rather than in person, thus minimizing some of the fear many victims have about face-to-face confrontations. 144 Finally, victims should be given the option, but not be required to attend an offender's allocution and public acceptance of responsibility.
As to secondary victimization, any criminal justice method of responding to crime potentially entails secondary victimization. 145 However, restorative justice as a victim-driven process is arguably less likely to cause secondary victimization than traditional retributive justice. With respect to witnessing the offender's allocution, again, the victim should be allowed to attend at her option, but not be required to do so. Proper preparation of the victim for hearing the batterer's acceptance of responsibility, including the possibilities of diverging stories, may further preempt secondary victimization.
Restorative justice proponents often talk about the role that apology can play in a RJ model. 146 Within the context of domestic violence, this raises two concerns. First, apologies by batterers are not uncommon. In fact, apologies, whether sincere or not, are now understood to be one of the "tactics"
342
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35 used by intimate abusers to keep victims in relationships. 147 Expressions of contrition, coupled with promises not to repeat such behavior, are powerful tools to draw back in a victim who may, in all other respects, love the offender. 148 The expression of an apology, however, does not mean the violence ends. Thus, the role of apology in cases of interpersonal violence is already compromised. Nonetheless, the standard batterer's apologies take place in private, between just the victim and offender. A public apology may yet have some benefit in that it reduces the batterer's credibility should he offend again in the future. Further, as C.J. Petrucci has noted, even an insincere apology may nonetheless be instrumental in behavior change.
149
Whether this will be borne out in practice with domestically violent offenders remains to be seen. Given that denial and minimization are typical of domestic violence offenders, the public admission could serve to rebut any subsequent denial; as a practical matter, it also could be used in a subsequent probation violation hearing should a batterer reoffend during the period of probation.
Second, some who advocate the use of apologies tout the potential for an apology to create space for forgiveness, and thus further healing for both the victim and offender. 150 As is true with apologies in the context of intimate violence, however, forgiveness often has already been offered by the victim on other occasions following post-violence contrition. Part of the problem here is that in an ongoing relationship, apologies, forgiveness, and letting go of old wrongs is in fact necessary to a continued (healthy) relationship. Even in the context of a discontinued violent relationship, there is often continued interaction between the parties, whether it is because they remain in the same community of friends, or because they have children together. 151 The more central issue for our purposes here, though, is that a public statement of wrongdoing, coupled with an apology to the victim, can result in the victim feeling coerced into offering forgiveness, even if she is not required to do so. Thus, although a court of law may be an appropriate place for confessions, 152 abusers is more problematic. Thus, in advocating here for an expanded use of public acceptance of responsibility, I do not mean to also advocate for public apologies by batterers to their victims. A problem similar to that posed by the idea of apology and forgiveness is the potential for reconciliation of the parties. 153 Two aspects of reconciliation are problematic in the context of domestic violence. If reconciliation (which in this context would mean the victim and the batterer getting back into a relationship) is the objective, then first, perhaps a courtroom is not the proper place for that to take place, and second, reuniting a batterer and his victim should be discouraged, not encouraged by the court system. It seems reasonable that once a relationship has become violent, the relationship is less likely to become healthy again. If there is no actual reuniting anticipated, then the landscape is different. Under a restorative justice approach, the reconciliation at issue is about reconciling the offender with the community at large and the victim reconciling with the past and moving forward. Courtrooms seem more appropriate for encouraging that kind of reconciliation.
As discussed in this section, a restorative justice response to domestic violence is consistent with a number of strands of feminist jurisprudence, as is the public truth-telling proposal argued for in this Article. Further, although there are some valid feminist concerns with these efforts, many of these concerns already exist within our traditional criminal justice response, or can be accommodated in a system that would incorporate (or expand) the use of public acceptance of responsibility by intimate abusers.
IV. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PERPETRATORS AND PUBLIC TRUTH-TELLING: AN OPPORTUNITY UNDER DIVERSION STATUTES AND PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES
As discussed above, there may be a unique benefit to domestic violence survivors from the offender's public admission of guilt. This benefit comes only with a justice response that emphasizes confession rather than denial.
154
Although not the central focus of the criminal justice system in the United tian tradition, the concept of forgiveness can also be found in Ubuntu theology. 153 GOODMARK, supra note 18, at 182. 154 See discussion infra Part I.A (discussing benefits to victims of hearing public admissions of guilt). It may also be the case that offenders can benefit from publicly accepting of responsibility. It not only might serve as the necessary prerequisite to cognitive and behavioral change in the batterer, but it also could serve a healing and reintegrative function for the offender. For other examples of the benefit of public confession for offenders, see Shoshana Felman's work that analyzes the role of confession in the O.J. Petty drug offenses, juvenile offenses, and family violence offenses typically form the meat and potatoes of most diversion programs.
162 A number of states also use diversion in criminal cases where the defendant is a juvenile. 163 The arguments for and against diversion in each of these three categories of cases differ, as do the eligibility requirements, and although a full discussion of drug and juvenile diversion is beyond the scope of this paper, these two categories are briefly discussed here to provide the larger context in which family violence diversion sits. The alternative diversion track typically consists of some form of counseling for the offender, which is quite often a combination of individual or group counseling about violence and substance abuse counseling if the offender was using drugs or alcohol during or prior to the incident. 164 for Pretrial Release and Diversion 19 (Aug. 1995) Simon advocates the recommendation of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges ("NCJFCJ") that diversion only be used in the narrowest of cases, and only if the defendant in fact confesses to the act or acts of domestic violence. As the NCJFCJ recommendation suggests, allowing an offender to obtain counseling in lieu of other punishment must, at a minimum, be predicated upon admission of a problem in the first place-a basic tenet of any 12-step program. Id. at 259 (citing NCJFCJ and stating that a plea of guilty is the most important element of diversion). (The author notes that an offender's failure to admit that he battered his partner is not necessarily an indicator that an offender will not realize belief and behavior change through a well-designed bat-[Vol. 35
B. State of the Law on Diversion
This section summarizes the current state of the law on diversion in the United States. As this section demonstrates, most states have some form of a diversion program outlined in their state statutes addressing some form of criminal activity. The typical diversion program addresses juvenile offenses, petty drug offenses, or domestic violence, and these are discussed in turn.
Juvenile Cases
The most common use of diversion is for juvenile offenses. 165 The theory behind diversion in juvenile cases is that a diversion court "could do good by simply doing less harm than the traditional criminal processes." 166 To advocates of diversion, the main "characteristic of a diversionary argument for juvenile justice is its attention to the harmful nature of criminal punishment for the young."
167 By contrast, traditional criminal processes are thought by some to educate youth in the ways of crime.
168 That is, the policy choice embodied in diversion for juveniles is based on the premise that youth are, in some ways, still malleable, amenable to reform but also to further corruption.
Policy-makers' belief in the possibility of juvenile reform can be contrasted with the unclear reformability of the intimate violence offender. It is this distinction that in part drives domestic violence advocates to challenge the use of diversion for domestic violence perpetrators.
169
Research conducted since Lenore Simon's article, discussed above, 170 suggests that there are different kinds of family violence offenders. Because of this, a one-size-fits-all model, such as mandatory incarceration for batterers, is no longer scientifically justifiable. Further, although many will not, some offenders will respond well to domestic violence counseling. 171 For those who fall into the category that could respond well to treatment, diverterer's counseling program. These programs sometimes do lead to a previously denying offender finally admitting the wrongful acts he committed.) 165 See generally Franklin Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2477 REV. (2000 . Zimring expresses concern that conservative pressures towards accountability of juveniles jeopardizes decades of work in juvenile justice. sion should still be a viable option, although confession should be a mandatory prerequisite. So why pursue this avenue even when there is no evidence to date that incarceration results in any greater reduction in future offending by the majority of batterers?
172 The reason to move forward is the unique benefit to victims that comes with diversion predicated on confession, which does not arise from ordinary criminal prosecution. That is, the therapeutic effect for the victim of hearing an offender's admission of what he has done to her is an important benefit for victims, and one that should not be ignored. 173 A public confession of wrongdoing may go a long way to restoring a victim's place within her community of family and friends as an honest person, but also her sense of the world as a place where truth again is respected.
That there occasionally may be a victim harmed by the youthful offender's conduct is accounted for by a provision requiring, at the request of the victim, victim consultation prior to diversion of juveniles. 174 However, in further contrast with domestic violence cases where victims are frequently consulted, victim consultation in juvenile cases is the exception rather than the norm, as there are identifiable victims less frequently in juvenile cases than in domestic violence cases. 
Drug Offenses
Many state statutes also provide for diversion for minor drug offenses. 176 The rationale for diversion in these cases is similar to, and yet different from, that for juvenile cases. The typical diversion-appropriate drug offense is simple possession of a small amount of a given drug. 177 If a drug offender is charged in this way, prosecutors presume that the drug was for personal consumption rather than distribution. The offense charged is therefore, in two different senses, personal to the offender: first, there is no 172 See discussion infra at Part III.B.2. 173 See infra at Part II.B (discussing benefits to victims of hearing public admissions of guilt). 174 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-399 (West, Westlaw through First Reg. Sess.). 175 Recent programs in the United States, Canada, and some other countries increasingly are incorporating community conferencing or sentencing circle models that involve not just the victim, but also other community members when addressing juvenile offenses. See infra Part I.B (discussing restorative justice initiatives). 176 See supra note 162 (for drug diversion statutes). 177 Ohio law, which provides for "intervention in lieu of conviction," is representative of such statutes, requiring that the amount of drugs found in the possession of a defendant not qualify as a first-, second-, or third-degree felony. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.041 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Legislation). Drug possession felonies that would not qualify for diversion involve "bulk" amounts of drugs likely possessed by a defendant for resale. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.11 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Legislation).
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Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35 mandated counseling program, given the difficulty of prosecuting domestic violence cases after a period of time has elapsed (such as would be the case several months post-plea). However, as a practical matter, Phoenix and Mesa prosecutors often were forced to settle for a pre-rather than postconviction plea, since judges in those courts often ordered diversion as the sole punishment even post-conviction-which they were empowered to do under the pre-2004 law. 202 This typically happened against the wishes of both the prosecutor and the victim. That is, in these major metropolitan jurisdictions, under the pre-2004 statutory scheme, defense attorneys were disinclined to enter into a post-conviction diversion, choosing to go to trial unless a pre-conviction plea was offered by the prosecutor. This dynamic, triggered by divergent judicial practices and norms in Tucson versus Phoenix, explains the predominance of pre-rather than post-conviction pleas in the Phoenix/Maricopa County area.
203
In both the Tucson and Phoenix/Mesa jurisdictions, however, and under both the pre-2004 and the post-2004 statutory schema, in those instances where offenders in fact enter a guilty plea, the plea bargain and entry of the guilty plea typically happen when the victim is not present. 204 That is, such an admission typically takes place at the point of either an arraignment or a pre-trial hearing, which victims typically do not attend. 205 Thus, the benefit to victims of hearing an admission of guilt or acceptance of responsibility rarely, if ever, happens in Arizona despite the possibility that its statutory scheme and actual practice would provide for it.
Virginia's diversion statute 206 provides for diversion upon one of two events: either (1) a guilty plea by the offender, 207 or (2) a finding by the judge that there is sufficient evidence to convict 208 (a type of modified Alford plea 209 in which a defendant enters a plea acknowledging only that there is sufficient evidence to convict). 210 Despite that the statute provides for different routes to diversion, the practice in Virginia by prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel who deal with family violence cases is not so varied. Three different practices are evident in Virginia, and all three are in direct opposition to the recommendations of the NCJFCJ. 211 First, in Virginia, resort to diversion is the norm rather than the exception in the majority of family violence cases, despite the NCJFCJ's recommendation against diversion. 212 
